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THE GUARDIANS GUARDING THEMSELVES: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE ON NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION
MARK SIDEL*
We are witnessing a new wave of nonprofit self-regulation in Asia and
the United States that results from government moves to strengthen regula-
tion of nonprofits and charities, and the perceived "failure" of earlier forms
of weaker, often code- or "best practice"-based self-regulation. In both
Asia and the United States, the new nonprofit self-regulation features mul-
tiple models and initiatives, including aggressive associational entrepre-
neurs who view nonprofit accountability as a type of market and effective
self-regulation as a means to prosper in that market. In that new self-
regulatory environment, alliance with government to engage in and
strengthen self-regulation is increasingly important for multiple reasons: to
forestall unilateral regulatory action, to emphasize the role and importance
of self-regulation, to provide resources and incentives for stricter self-
regulation to take hold and succeed, and to provide resources for initially
weak and undercapitalized associational entrepreneurs.
In one sense, the new wave of nonprofit self-regulation supports an
earlier analysis of self-regulation: Without effective funding or regulatory
incentives-without conditioning either government resources (such as
funding for social services or health care) or regulatory action (such as
formation approvals or tax exemptions) on compliance with self-regulation
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standards-nonprofit self-regulation may have a general salutary effect on
strengthening norms and standards within the nonprofit sector, but it is
unlikely to be able to force compliance with norms or to discipline those
who violate standards.
In certain fields, that sort of strict, incentive-based, government-allied
self-regulation may be appropriate. But as we move toward more detailed
and stricter forms of nonprofit self-regulation, we must take care that those
stricter, incentive-based, government-allied accountability standards do not
prevent smaller or more innovative groups from receiving the financial or
regulatory benefits accorded to other nonprofits. We must ensure that
stricter self-regulation does not narrow nonprofit autonomy and freedom.
And we must be cautious that self-regulation supported and incentivized by
government does not become, in effect, a form of government "nationaliza-
tion" of nonprofit governance and management through an ostensible "self-
regulatory" process.
At the same time, the nonprofit and philanthropic sector must indeed
find ways to condemn, discipline, and ostracize organizations that violate
the norms or ethics of the nonprofit community. The failure to condemn
such practices has weakened social support for the nonprofit sector, and
that continued failure opens the door to stricter and more pervasive gov-
ernment regulation-and to even greater difficulty in finding a balance
between order and freedom, accountability and autonomy, in the American
nonprofit sector.
I. INTRODUCTION: NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY
AND THE DRIVE FOR SELF-REGULATION
The American nonprofit and philanthropic sector is mired in another
of its recurring crises of accountability; the pre~licament is motivating this
symposium.1 Only a few examples are needed to indicate the scale of the
problem, at least in terms of politics and public perception. Some nonprofit
leaders and other employees allegedly take unreasonably high salaries,2 use
nonprofit assets for personal air travel and other personal expenses, 3 en-
1. For a recent, general review of accountability debates (though without a focus on self-
regulation), see Jon Christensen, Asking the Do-Gooders to Prove They Do Good, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2004, at B9.
2. This allegedly occurred in the cases of the United Way, the Statue of Liberty Foundation, and
the Nature Conservancy. See. e.g., Joe Stephens, Nature Conservancy Retools Board to 'Tighten'
Oversight, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A21.
3. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, A Foundation Travels Far from Sesame Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2002, at C1; Beth Healy et al., Spotlight Report, Charity at Home: Some Officers of Charities Steer
Assets to Selves, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at Al; Beth Healy et al., Spotlight, A Lack of Oversight:
Foundations' Tax Returns Left Unchecked, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2003, at Al; Kate Shatzkin,
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gage in indefensible sales or loans to officers and executives, 4 or engage in
other forms of self-dealing. 5 Some charities have failed to respond ade-
quately to federal and state mandates for disclosure of financial and pro-
grammatic information.6 Others have engaged in the criticized employment
of tax shelters,7 employed conservation easements and land trusts to avoid
both scrutiny and taxation,8 used the nonprofit form as credit counseling
organizations to cheat consumers,9 and participated in charitable fundrais-
ing as a vehicle for political donations. 10
All this adds up to a nonprofit accountability problem of visible pro-
portions-though, it must be said, it involves a few rather than most non-
profits. But these issues are not limited to outrageous salaries, self-dealing,
and other abuses. The arrogance, insensitivity, and lack of accountability
Board of AIDS Agency Probes Chiefs Expenses; Official Fired After Alleging Misuse of Funds at
HERO, BALT. SUN, Mar. 20, 2004, at lB.
4. See, e.g., Harvy Lipman & Grant Williams, Donors Set Up Grant-Making Groups, Then
Borrow Back Their Gifts, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 5, 2004, at 6; Rafael A. Olmeda & Ivette M.
Yee, Charities' Loans Draw Criticism; Nonprofit Groups' Practice Called Unethical, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fla.), Feb. 13, 2004, at IB; Jeff Kosseff, Nonprofit's Loans Scrutinized, OREGONIAN, June 22, 2004, at
DI; Jeremiah Hall, When Your Donations Fund Insider Perks, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, June 21,
2004, at 13.
5. For just a few examples of the many that could be cited, see Nina Bernstein, Officials Over-
looked Dire Signs at Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at BI (discussing Hale House); Stephanie
Strom, Questions About Some Charities' Activities Lead to a Push for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2004, at 23 (California scandals include a "find-raiser who pleaded guilty to defrauding high-
profile contributors through Hollywood charity galas and to the collapse of a nonprofit group that used
donations intended for other charities to cover its own costs"); Pete Slover & Sudeep Reddy, Scandal
Inside Texas Power Grid; Exclusive: Morning News Inquiry Finds Suspect Deals, Insider Intrigue,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 4, 2004, at IA.
6. See, e.g., Stephen G. Greene, Ousted Trustees Should Repay $5 Million to Hawaiian Trust,
Report Says, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 1, 2000, at 32.
7. The June 22, 2004, Senate Finance Committee hearings on nonprofit accountability discussed
inappropriate use of tax shelters fairly extensively. See Charity Oversight and Reform.' Keeping Bad
Things from Happening to Good Charities: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong.,
3, 30-31, 36-37, 39-41 (2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/95482.pdf [hereinafter
Charity Oversight and Reform Hearings]- For an overseas example of the problems tax shelter ar-
rangements can cause, see Peter Watson, Poisonous Intrigue of a Tycoon's Last Days, TIMES (London),
Apr- 15, 2004, at 8.
8. See, eg., Stephens, supra note 2; Joe Stephens, Overhaul of Nature Conservancy Urged,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al; David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, IRS Toughens Scrutiny of Land
Gifts, WASH. POST, July 1, 2004, at Al.
9. For a recent Congressional staff report on this growing issue, see PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFS., PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY:
ABusivE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING (Mar. 24, 2004), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/032404psistaffreportcreditcounsel.pdf. The current IRS guidance for
determining when credit counseling organizations should lose their nonprofit status is DAVID L.
MARSHALL, INTERNAL REENUE SERV., ILM 2004431023, MEMORANDUM: CREDIT COUNSELING
ORGANIZATIONS (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0431023.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Rick Cohen, Giving Thats All About Getting, WASH. POST, June 6, 2004, at B1. A
number of these matters are discussed at length in the June 2004 Senate Finance Committee hearings on
charity oversight and reform. See Charity Oversight and Reform Hearings, supra note 7.
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that these reports reveal in a few nonprofits and foundations have also
sparked increasingly direct resistance from both recipients of charitable
funds and from donors.
A few examples of that resistance show that both recipients and do-
nors are beginning to challenge, in increasingly open ways, what they per-
ceive to be nonprofits' lack of accountability. Poor Hispanic farm workers
and Native American residents of eastern Washington State sued the North-
west Area Foundation when the Foundation refused to pay expenses prom-
ised to the workers.'I Hershey Foods workers, retirees, executives, and
community members took to the streets when the charitable trust that con-
trols Hershey Foods decided to diversify its holdings away from a concen-
tration in Hershey Foods stock, prompting action by the state legislature,
Attorney General, and a local judge who eventually barred the company's
sale. 12 Residents of the tiny Montana community of Martinsdale went to
court to prevent the trust controlling one of America's great house muse-
ums from breaking up and sending away a collection of French, American,
and Native American art. 13 In Cleveland, Princeton, and elsewhere, angry
11. It is important to note that the Yakima farmworkers did not sue for the $15 million grant
discussed and worked on (for several years) with the Northwest Area Foundation. All agree that such an
action would quickly and rightly have been thrown out of court. They sued instead for $1.25 million of
expenses allegedly promised and the time and effort they spent on studies commissioned by the North-
west Area Foundation. On this dispute, see Minnesota Council on Foundations, Northwest Area Foun-
dation Concludes Yakima Valley Exploration Planning, at http://www.mcf.org/mcf/whats-
new/archives/August2002/nwafO2O827.htm (Aug. 27, 2002); Robert Franklin, Foundation Sued for
Pulling Out of Antipoverty Plan, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 5, 2002, at 4B; Stephen G. Greene,
Prospective Grantees Take Foundation to Court and Ask for $1.25-Million, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Dec. 12, 2002, at 7; Stephanie Strom, A Withdrawn Aid Offer Leaves Yakima Bruised, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2003, at A20; Paul Demko, Something for the Little People; The Twin Cities-based Northwest
Area Foundation has a $450 Million Endowment to Use on Charitable Programs. So Why Has h1 Been
Nearly Invisible for Years?, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis), May 28, 2003, at 13, available at
http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1173/articlel 1271.asp; Linda Ashton, Yakima Residents Suing
Charity, SEATTLE TIMES, June 1, 2003, at B7; Linda Ashton, A Promise to Fight Poverty Goes Unful-
filled, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), June 1, 2003, at C2; Romero v- Northwest Area Found., No.
CY-02-3135-EFS (ED. Wash. Aug. 18, 2003) (order granting defendant's motion to dismiss); Ian
Wilhelm, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Minnesota Foundation, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 4,
2003, at 19.
12. On the Hershey saga, see Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability
and the Law in Modern American Philanthropy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2003). That article cites to the
excellent coverage of the Hershey case in the Patriot-News (Harrisburg, Pa.), New York Times, and
other publications.
13. On the Bair Museum dispute, see Jim Gransbery, Bair Museum Won't Reopen, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Mont.), Feb. 4, 2003, at IC; Stephanie Strom, Once a Home, Now a Museum of Fate Un-
known, N.Y. TIMES, Apr, 2, 2003, at A 10; James P. Roscoe, Guest Opinion: Bair Trust Goals for
Charity, Museum Must Be Weighed, BILLINGSGAZET-TE.COM (Mont.), May 3, 2003, available at
http:/Iwww.billingsgazette.com/index.php?id=-&display-rednews/2003/05/03ibuild/opinion/guest.inc;
Associated Press, Built on Philanthropy, Montana Museum's Future Now in Jeopardy, NEWS-
STAR.COM (Okla.), May 31, 2003, available at http://www.news-star.com/stories/053-
103/NewIO.shtml.
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donors have suspended their grantmaking14 or sued for return of funds or
other remedies' 5 when recipient organizations fail, in the donors' percep-
tions, to remain accountable for the use of funds.
There have been two broad, traditional responses to the recurring ac-
countability crises of America's nonprofits. The first is stricter federal and
state regulation of the nonprofit sector, through increased requirements for
transparency and disclosure and enhanced regulation of compensation, the
auditing process, the use of assets for personal gain, and other problematic
areas.
The most recent accountability crisis has, for example, provoked staff
proposals in Congress that would tighten exempt status (including mandat-
ing the review of nonprofits' tax-exempt status every five years, tightening
requirements for donor-advised funds and eliminating certain supporting
organizations, significantly restricting the exemption standards for credit
counseling organizations, and tightening nonprofit tax shelters), as well as
reform insider and disqualified person rules (including applying the stricter
private foundation self-dealing rules to public charities; expanding the
definition of disqualified persons; increasing taxes for self-dealing, jeop-
ardizing investments, and taxable expenditures; prohibiting or limiting
compensation of private foundation trustees; and limiting compensation of
disqualified persons). 
1 6
The most recent Congressional staff proposals would also reform
grantmaking and foundation expenses (including seeking to limit founda-
tion administrative expenses; incentivizing additional grantmaking; and
limiting travel, meals, and accommodation expenses). They would
strengthen federal-state regulatory coordination (including setting standards
for review of acquisitions or conversions of nonprofits by for-profits and
providing states with authority to pursue federal tax violations by nonprof-
its), and strengthen disclosure and transparency (by improving the Forms
14. Steven Litt, Billionaire Blasts CWRU Board, Halts Charitable Gifts Across City, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), June 6, 2002, at Al; John L. Pulley, Money Talks, More So When It Walks,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 25, 2002, at A29; Susan Ruiz Patton, Lewis Will Open Wallet ifNonprof-
its Work Jointly, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 6, 2003, at B1; Sarah Hollander, Lewis Says He'll
Take Lock Off Pocketbook, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 8, 2003, at Al.
15. See, e.g., Stephen G. Greene, Seeking Control in Court, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 28,
2002, at 6; Stephanie Strom, Donors Add Watchdog Role to Relations with Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2003, at Ag; Jessica Bruder, Give Us Back the Money, Heirs Tell Princeton, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2004, § 14NJ, at 3; Dahleen Glanton, Old South Rises to Save Symbols; Fight for Heritage vs. Sensitivi-
ties, CI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2002, at 1.
16- STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 108TH CONG., STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT 1-5 (2004), at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/62204stfdis.pdf [hereinafter STAFF DISCUSSION
DRAFT]. For an initial response from the nonprofit community, see PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
INTERIM REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE (March 1, 2005), at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interimr/PanelReport.pdf
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990, financial statements, and filing duties; providing penalties for incom-
plete or inaccurate federal disclosures; requiring independent audits of
nonprofits with over $250,000 in gross receipts; requiring more transparent
disclosure of related organizations and insider transactions; and requiring
public disclosure of financial statements). The proposals also would
strengthen nonprofit governance (by strengthening board duties, enhancing
independent board composition, making board removal easier, and begin-
ning a national accreditation process), as well as funding state oversight
and enforcement of exempt organizations. 17
Accountability issues have also provoked proposals for stricter state
regulation. Perhaps most prominent is Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's
proposed extension of Sarbanes-Oxley to nonprofits in New York, which
would require nonprofit officer verifications of reporting data (like those
that must be provided by officers of public companies under Sarbanes-
Oxley), to tighten regulation of nonprofit board and committee structures,
expand required audits for some larger nonprofits, and strengthen self-
dealing rules. 18 But New York is not the only state active in this area. Leg-
islation pending in Massachusetts "would require charity and foundation
executives to certify the accuracy of their financial statements, create inde-
pendent audit committees at nonprofit groups with more than $750,000 in
revenue, and maintain tighter control over compensation, among other
things."' 19 Similar legislation is pending in California. 20
The second response to these accountability problems has been to try
to turn to self-regulation, toward a variety of attempts by the nonprofit and
17. Id. at 5-16. The staff recommendations would also vest equity powers in the Tax Court and
allow private actions by nonprofit directors/trustees and private relator actions by individuals. Id. at 16-
18.
18. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org." Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004); Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be
a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 559 (2005) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law]. Sarbanes-Oxley has been an
important recent spur to self-regulation, as BoardSource and Independent Sector indicate:
[W]e have heard the wake-up call. For all of us in the sector, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has
caused a renewed realization that nonprofit organizations rely on-and must protect-the in-
dispensable and unequivocal confidence and trust of our constituents. Self-regulation and
proactive behavior will always prove more powerful than compulsory respect of laws.
BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2003), at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf. For other
summaries, see Michael Anft & Grant Williams, States Propose New Accountability Regulations for
Nonprofit Groups, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 19, 2004, at 8; Michael Anti & Grant Williams,
Redefining Good Governance, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 19, 2004, at 6.
19. Strom, supra note 5. Brakman Reiser discusses the Massachusetts legislation in some detail in
There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 18. See also Michael Rezendes & Sacha Pfeiffer, Legislation
Eyed to Fight Abuses at Foundations, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2004, at A l.
20. Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 18, discusses the California legislation.
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philanthropic sector to control its own behavior, strengthen standards, and
increase transparency through its own efforts.
Nonprofit self-regulation efforts have had two overlapping goals. One
is functional-improving the effectiveness of nonprofit activity through
higher standards, enhanced transparency, improved operations, community
building, and stronger learning processes. The second is essentially politi-
cal-improving nonprofit credibility (partly through functional and sub-
stantive improvements, to be sure) and, crucially, forestalling enhanced
federal and state regulation of the nonprofit sector. In the literature on these
questions there is a sense that nonprofit self-regulation, at least in the
United States, has played a role in encouraging higher standards but has not
had the incentives or enforcement mechanisms available to deal with sig-
nificant problems and violations.
2 1
This Article deals with those newer, intensified efforts to develop
nonprofit self-regulation. I suggest that even the "weaker," "best practices"
forms of nonprofit self-regulation in the United States and Asia play a use-
ful role in strengthening nonprofit standards. I also seek to identify some of
the newer features of the current wave of self-regulatory initiative in the
United States as well as in Asia: the emergence of newer "associational
entrepreneurs" (in competition with the traditional "trade associations"
such as Independent Sector and the Council on Foundations) that seek to
satisfy a social and market need for better self-regulation, experimentation
with forms of incentives to encourage compliance with self-regulatory
norms, and alliance with government to put those incentives in place and to
establish a stronger political basis for self-regulation.
But this Article first begins abroad, in Asia, with a comparative ap-
proach to nonprofit self-regulation. We start outside the United States to
avoid the usual pattern of comparing the foreign to a domestic, American
model. That mode of research has been at work in the nonprofit arena as
well, where a standard research paradigm has been to compare foreign
21. There is substantial literature on nonprofit self-regulation in the United States. For useful
work, see, for example, David C. Hammack, Accountability and Nonprofit Organizations: A Historical
Perspective, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 127 (1995); Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of
Nonprofit Organizations and Those no Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT.
& LEADERSHIP 141 (1995); BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET: NGO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (Michael Edwards & David Hulme eds., 1996); Robert 0. Bothwell,
Trends in Self-Regulation and Transparency of Nonprofits in the US., 2 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.
(2000), at http://www.icnl.org/JOURNAL/vol2iss3/Arn_bothwell.htm; PAUL C. LIGHT, MAKING
NONPROFITS WORK (2000); Angela L. Bies, Accountability, Organizational Capacity, and Continuous
Improvement: Findings from Minnesota's Nonprofit Sector, 31 NEw DIRECTIONS FOR PHILANTHROPIC
FUNDRAISING 51 (2001); Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT
AMERICA 471 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
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experience to a U.S. model that is assumed to be at least more complete,
and usually, somehow, better.
Here, we reverse that paradigm by first seeking to draw some lessons
from the Asian experience, by analyzing several energetic initiatives to
build nonprofit self-regulation in Asia, where the nonprofit and philan-
thropic sector has also grown rapidly in recent decades. The discussion of
the Asian experience with nonprofit self-regulation is based on research
done with the support of the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium
("APPC") and utilizes data gathered from the first significant survey of
nonprofit self-regulation conducted in Asia. That report uncovered literally
dozens of codes of conduct and ethics, disclosure mechanisms, certification
and validation schemes, ratings exercises, accounting and organizational
standards, and other self-regulation initiatives underway throughout the
region.
22
This analysis of nonprofit self-regulation in Asia is intended to shed
greater light and enhance transparency in a sector regarded throughout Asia
as lacking in transparency, and to light the path toward substantive im-
provement in nonprofit operations and effectiveness. In political terms, the
primary goal is to forestall even greater government regulation, usually at
the national level, and to strengthen the public and political credibility of a
sector regarded, again virtually throughout Asia, as a haven of murky deals,
unsavory connections to government, and often unabashed commerciality.
These comparisons from and to Asia are not intended to give short shrift to
other important comparative perspectives, including the recent focus on
nonprofit self-regulation in the United Kingdom,23 Australia, 24 and Can-
ada,25 among other countries.
22. MARK SIDEL, TRENDS IN NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION:
INITIAL DATA ON INITIATIVES, EXPERIMENTS AND MODELS IN SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES (2003) (research
report prepared for the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium and the International Symposium on
Nonprofit Accountability (Manila, Sept. 2003)), available at www.asianphilanthropy.org/stag-
ing/aboutlNonprofitSelfRegulation.pdf and http://myweb.uiowa.edu/sidel/.
23. In its 2002 report Private Action, Public Benefit, the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit strongly
encouraged self-regulation among fundraisers, where the need for accountability was perceived to be a
particular problem. But that was coupled with a distinct threat:
It was clear from our consultations that fundraising organisations favour self-regulation, in
contrast to the public appetite for stronger legal regulation. The Government considers that a
self-regulatory scheme which the sector itself helps to set up and run has the best chance of
success. This new scheme would build on the valuable work, including work on codes of
good practice, already undertaken by organisations such as the Institute of Fundraising and
the Public Fundraising Regulatory Association (PFRA). However, if self-regulation is not
successful, the Home Secretary should have a back-up power to introduce a system of statu-
tory regulation.
PRIME MINSTER'S STRATEGY UNIT, PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT; A REVIEW OF CHARITIES AND
THE WIDER NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR §§ 6.29, 6.30 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/su/voluntary/report/index.ht. The Institute of Fundraising (U.K.) has now proposed a self-
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So, in short, this Article focuses on three themes in considering the
newer wave of nonprofit self-regulatory activities:
A. The New Self-Regulatory "Associational Entrepreneurship"
Newer nonprofit self-regulatory initiatives in Asia and the United
States are increasingly diverse, going well beyond traditional code- or best
practices-based approaches in organizations such as nonprofit trade groups.
A new set of institutional players has arrived on the scene: Many of the
newer nonprofit self-regulatory initiatives are led by what I term "associa-
tional entrepreneurs." These are organizations that have stepped into the
underserved market of nonprofit accountability and have sought to contrib-
ute to society and to grow their institutions by serving that market, often
aggressively and with government backing, with new or improved forms of
self-regulation.
regulatory mechanism through an independent report, and the Charities Aid Foundation is exploring
implementation. See RODNEY BUSE, THE FUTURE OF SELF-REGULATION OF CHARITY FUNDRAISING,
PHASE 2 REPORT, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.institute-of-fundraising.org.uk/documents/Buse%20Commission%20final%20report.doc;
http://www.busecommission-org uk/public/does/Buse/ 20Commission%2Phase%22%2 Report.pdf
My thanks to Debra Morris for this information.
For a historical perspective on self-regulation in the U.K., see also DIANA LEAT, VOLUNTARY
ORGANISATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY (London, NCVO, 1988), Diana Leat, Are Voluntary Organisa-
tions Accountable?, in VOLUNTARY AGENCIES: CHALLENGES OF ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT
61 (David Billis & Margaret Harris eds., 1996); Margaret Harris, Voluntary Sector Governance-
Problems in Practice and Theory in the United Kingdom and North America, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON VOLUNTARY ACTION: RESHAPING THE THIRD SECTOR 97 (David Lewis ed., 1999);
HELMUT K. ANHEIER, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, MANAGEMENT, POLICY (2005).
24. For a very brief summary of the Australian scene, see SIDEL, supra note 22 For details, see
Maureen Cleary, Australia: The Role and Influence of the Nonprofit Sector in Australia, in
GOVERNANCE, ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 18 (2003) (collection
of reports prepared for the September 2003 Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium conference), avail-
able at http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/staging/about/AUSTRALIAl.pdf, AUSTL. COUNCIL FOR
INT'L DEV., ACFID CODE OF CONDUCT FOR NON GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS
(amended Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.aefid.asn.au/eode/Code-of Conduct.htm;
PHILANTHROPY AUSTL., CODE OF PRACTICE (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
www.philanthropy.org.au/about/code.htm; Fundraising Inst. Australia, Code of Professional Conduct &
Ethics; Individual Members, at http://www.fia.org.au/Content/NavigationMenu/Aboutl/CodeofEth-
ics/Codes of Conduct.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); Peter Carroll & Myles MeGregor-Lowndes, A
Standard for Regulatory Compliance? Industry Self-Regulation, the Courts and AS3806-1998, 60
AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 80 (2001); CHARITIES DEFINITION INQUIRY, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL.,
REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE DEFINITION OF CHARITY AND RELATED ORGANISATIONS ch. 32, at
275 (2001), available at http://www.cdi.gov.au/html/report.htm.
25. Chris Miller, Toward a Self-Regulatory Form of Accountability in the Voluntary Sector, 30
POL'Y & POL. 551 (2002).
20051
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
B. The New Alliances with Government and the Motivations for Alliance
Second, those newer initiatives, in Asia and the United States, now
explicitly seek to build alliances between the sector and government insti-
tutions to strengthen the force of the new self-regulatory initiatives and
mechanisms. Those new alliances have multiple motivations: forestalling
new regulation, strengthening the political position of the nonprofit sector,
and bolstering-through endorsement, funding, or required compliance-
the particular self-regulation initiatives of the new nonprofit "associational
entrepreneurs." Thus the new alliance with government is a matter of de-
fense, of political sense, and of organizational strategy.
C. Parsing Success and Failure in Nonprofit Self-Regulation:
The Key Role of Incentives
Third, but closely related to the first two themes, new nonprofit self-
regulatory initiatives in Asia and the United States have certainly had some
success in extending and strengthening aspirational norms and standards
within the nonprofit community. Where they are pitched broadly-across
the entire nonprofit sector, for example, or an entire country, or where they
are not specifically tied to powerful significant incentives (such as govern-
ment funding or the availability of important government action such as
approval of formation or tax incentives)-they continue to have important
norm-strengthening functions but are very hard to enforce, and they in-
creasingly fail to satisfy government's demands for nonprofit
accountability.
To put it more plainly, this Article employs emerging evidence in Asia
and in the United States to show that a new wave of nonprofit self-
regulation is taking root, a wave that features aggressive associational en-
trepreneurs who view nonprofit accountability as a market to enter and
effective self-regulation as a means to prosper in that market. In that new
environment for nonprofit self-regulation, alliance with government is in-
creasingly important to forestall unilateral regulatory action, to emphasize
the role and power of self-regulation, and to provide resources for initially
weak and undercapitalized associational entrepreneurs. Additionally, the
new focus on nonprofit self-regulation supports an older theme: without
effective funding or regulatory incentives-without conditioning either
government resources or regulatory action (such as formation approvals or
tax exemptions) on compliance with self-regulation standards-nonprofit
self-regulation may have a general salutary effect in strengthening norms
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and standards within the nonprofit sector, but it is unlikely to be able to
force compliance with norms or to discipline those who violate standards.
II. NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY IN ASIA
AND THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE OF SELF-REGULATION
Nonprofit accountability is an issue in Asia as well as in the United
States. Throughout Asia, government attempts to force responsiveness in
the nonprofit sector and, in some cases, media exposure of nonprofit ex-
cesses have produced an environment of a conflicted state-a state that
seeks both to regulate nonprofits in order to prevent accountability abuses
that are then at least partly blamed on regulators and a state that increas-
ingly understands that the heavy hand of regulation is not conducive to
nonprofit effectiveness and creative responses to social problems, promo-
tion and protection of arts and culture, advocacy, and other nonprofit
tasks.26
Self-regulation, as a response to accountability issues, has grown in
use throughout Asia as well. It is a first and experimental wave of efforts,
intended to defend against more rigorous government regulation and to
respond to criticism from the public, media, regulators, and others. Non-
profit self-regulation in Asia has also strengthened new associational entre-
preneurs, built alliances and community within the nonprofit sector, and
strengthened ties to sympathetic government regulators in what are often
difficult environments for the nonprofit sector.
The current and first wave of nonprofit self-regulation in Asia in-
cludes a diverse array of forms, as the nonprofit sector in each country
discusses, debates, experiments with, and adopts self-regulation structure at
its own pace and based on its own conditions and needs.2 7 That complex
and exciting picture includes:
1. Formal accreditation, certification, validation, and licensing
mechanisms;
2. Evaluative mechanisms (such as ratings, grading, and scoring
systems);
26. On the problem of the conflicted state in nonprofit-state relations in Asia, see the country
studies in PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN SOUTH ASIA (Mark Sidel & Iftekhar Zaman eds., 2004); PHI-
LANTHROPY AND LAW IN ASIA (Thomas Silk ed., 1999), as well as the superb review in Barnett F.
Baron, The Legal Framework for Civil Society in East and Southeast Asia, 4 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
L. (July 2002), at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol4iss4/ar baronprint.htm. For specific treatment of the
context of state restrictions on foreign funding and state policy toward the commercial activities of
nonprofits, see Mark Sidel, States, Markets, and the Nonprofit Sector in South Asia: Judiciaries and the
Struggle for Capital in Comparative Perspective, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1611 (2004).
27. See SIDEL, supra note 22, at 2.
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3. Codes and other means to govern and improve conduct (such
as codes of conduct or ethics of various kinds);
4. "Intranet" self-regulatory measures within nonprofit net-
works or precursors to self-regulation in which domestic fund-
ing nonprofits encourage and require compliance with
standards by their domestic partners, grantees, or both;
5. Proposals for charity commissions or self-regulatory charity
registers; and
6. Other forms of self-regulation.
Self-regulation in Asia, as in the United States, seeks "to regulate
highly diversified matters: nonprofit governance, transparency and infor-
mation flows; conduct of directors, trustees and officers; fundraising; in-
vestment of donated funds; and a host of other important matters. ' '28 While
there are self-regulatory initiatives underway throughout Asia, many are
very new and generally limited. But in two countries-India and the Phil-
ippines-there have been a number of experiments, models, and initiatives
in nonprofit self-regulation. These two countries also exhibit strikingly
different patterns of nonprofit-state relations and therefore of the nature of
the law that governs nonprofit institutions.
29
III. INDIA
A. The Diversity of Self-Regulatory Experiments in India
India has one of the world's largest and most diverse nonprofit sec-
tors, and nonprofit self-regulation has been an area of discussion in India
for some years. In the mid-1980s, the nonprofit sector activist Bunker Roy
and others pressed for development of a code of conduct for the voluntary
sector, an effort that was resisted by some nonprofits and supported by
others. 30 In the 1990s, a number of experiments were conducted in non-
profit self-regulation, including several efforts to encourage softer, non-
28. Id.
29. For the full range of efforts underway in Asia, see id.; RAJ ESH TANDON, VOLUNTARY ACTION,
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE (2002) RAiESH TANDON & RANJITA MOHANTY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
GOVERNANCE (2002); Sanjay Agarwal & Noshir Dadrawala, Philanthropy and Law in India, in SIDEL
& ZAMAN, supra note 26; Sidel, supra note 26.
30. On Roy, see Neelesh Misra, India's Barefoot College Generation, UNESCO COURIER, Mar,
2000, at 19. On the self-regulatory efforts practiced by the organization he is most closely associated
with, the "Barefoot College" of Tilonia, see Barefoot College, at
http://www.barefootcollege.org/htmllaction.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). For some of his views, see
Bunker Roy, Transparency in the Voluntary Sector: A First Step, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY (Bombay),
Nov. 29, 1997. 1 am grateful to Bunker Roy for discussion of these issues.
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mandatory forms of self-regulation. A nonprofit resource center, Murray
Culshaw Advisory Services (Bangalore) ("MCAS"), encouraged nonprofits
to increase informational transparency to the public, donors, and the media
through more informative annual reports. MCAS issued several publica-
tions on producing effective annual reports, several evaluations of non-
profit sector annual reports, and at least one scorecard of effective annual
reports. 31 Similarly the Indian Centre for Philanthropy (based in Delhi) and
the Centre for Advancement of Philanthropy (Bombay) encouraged early
standard setting amongst the small but diverse and independent group of
indigenous Indian funders.
32
A separate early strand emphasized nonprofit-government alliance to
promote government-backed forms of self-regulation. Early proposals for a
"charity commission" adapted from the English model fit within this type
of mixed state-voluntary regulatory model, in which sectoral norms are
backed up by the threat of government sanction-and in which the gov-
ernment is a political ally of self-regulation. 33
In the early 1990s, a third strand emphasized the development of
codes of conduct and their use in the nonprofit community. One effort was
the development of "voluntary guiding principles" for the nonprofit sector
by Voluntary Action Network India ("VANI"). Another strand emphasized
joint nonprofit-government attempts to "validate" nonprofits-a weak form
of accreditation-through a joint project on nonprofit information disclo-
sure and validation conducted by the Charities Aid Foundation/India and
the Government of India's Planning Commission, and other initiatives. 34
Additionally, since 2001, another effort has been underway to build on the
earlier experiments, unite significant elements of the nonprofit sector in
support of a form of self-regulation, and come to agreement on a code of
conduct and related measures.
The current Indian attention to nonprofit self-regulation reflects con-
cern about government scrutiny, both at the federal and state levels; a per-
31. For further information about some of these materials, see Murray Culshaw Consulting,
Research Reports, at www.ftindraising-india.org/mccshop/researchreports/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
32. See Sampradaan Indian Centre for Philanthropy, at http://www.sampradaan.org (last visited
Mar. 7, 2005); Centre for Advancement of Philanthropy, at http://www.capindia.org (last visited Mar.
7, 2005). 1 am grateful to the Centres' respective directors, Pushpa Sundar and Noshir Dadrawala, for
extensive discussions of these issues.
33. The eminent Pushpa Sundar at the Sampradaan Indian Centre for Philanthropy is perhaps most
closely associated with this approach.
34. This complex history was reviewed briefly by Anil Singh of VANI at several of the Credibil-
ity Alliance regional meetings in 2002 and 2003. See, e.g., CREDIBILITY ALLIANCE, CONSENSUS BUILD-
ING WORKSHOP ON GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ENHANCING CREDIBILITY OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR




ceived distrust of the nonprofit sector among the public, government, and
media; and a distinct concern in the sector about that perception. But some
of these efforts have also been intended to bolster the role of self-regulatory
nonprofit entrepreneurs, to seek political and financial support from the
government for organizations that promote self-regulation, to develop an
alliance between more liberal sectors of the government with elements of
the nonprofit sector that support self-regulation, and to promote the use of
incentives in strengthening self-regulation.
These four newer features-self-regulation in the service of nonprofit
entrepreneurship, seeking government support for self-regulation and its
core organizers, building an alliance between nonprofit-friendly forces in
the government and the sector, and bringing incentives into the process-
are key elements of the Indian focus on self-regulation. 35 The results, so
far, are mixed: there has been some success in strengthening understanding
of norms and standards within a range of nonprofits. But in the absence of
very strong incentives for self-regulation (such as tying self-regulation to
government funding or to necessary government action such as approval of
formation or tax exemptions), most Indian nonprofit self-regulatory initia-
tives have gradually weakened.
B. Associational Entrepreneurship and Political Alliances
with Government
In the late 1990s, Voluntary Action Network India, a network of pro-
gressive Indian nonprofit organizations, adopted a set of "guiding princi-
ples" for Indian voluntary development organizations, a kind of "code of
conduct." The principles stipulated the characteristics, mission, govern-
ance, values, organizational integrity, accountability, transparency, and
financial management for nonprofits. A "membership review committee"
composed of VANI organizational members was to review member organi-
zations' compliance with the principles. 36 This was a reasonably explicit
attempt both to build self-regulation and to strengthen the umbrella organi-
zation conducting the process---organizational self-interest combined with
a social and market need. But in the absence of clear incentives for non-
35. 1 am grateful to Sanjay Agarwal, Niloy Banerjee, Mathew Cherian, Noshir Dadrawala, Priya
Viswanath, Gopa Kumar, and other Indian friends for discussions of the complex trail of experiments in
nonprofit self-regulation in India.
36. For the text of the code, see VOLUNTARY ACTION NETWORK INDIA, VOLUNTARY
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS, THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES (1999). See references to the principles in
CREDIBILITY ALLIANCE, WORKING GROUP FOR ENHANCING CREDIBILITY OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR,
MINUTES OF MEETING: FIRST DRAFT (Dec. 17, 2001), at http://credibility-
alliance.org/core-group/rw_ 17122001 _drafLdocument_%20after_meeting.pdf
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profits to buy into the "guiding principles"--neither government sanction
for the principles, nor other incentives-maintaining, expanding, and sus-
taining use of this code was problematic. It gradually faded from the Indian
scene. While the umbrella organization remains active, it was not strength-
ened for the long term by the self-regulation initiative.
A different effort, focused on both market entrepreneurship in self-
regulation and political alliance with government, was mounted in the late
1990s by another key associational umbrella, the Indian branch of the
U.K.'s Charities Aid Foundation ("CAF"), in alliance with a wing of the
government generally sympathetic to the nonprofit sector, the Planning
Commission of India. Carefully avoiding conflict-laden terms such as
"evaluation" or "accreditation," CAF and the Planning Commission sought
to "validate" a range of nonprofit organizations in a relatively nonevalua-
tive framework. CAF India and the Planning Commission worked together
for several years to develop a database of approximately 1,500 nonprofits,
with data provided by the organizations. The organizations were then
"validated" by CAF India, and the list of validated organizations and data
were then made available to government and private funders on the web
and in CD format. The program ended in 2002.
37
CAF and Planning Commission organizers noted several strengths-
organizational self-reporting, a reasonably clear validation decision, and
fairly widespread information-about the exercise and the organizations
participating. Identified weaknesses included problems of sustainability,
the verification of organizational data, difficulty in tracking changes in
organizations, difficulties in measuring the impact of organizations and
programs, and the relatively small sample of participating organizations
(relative to the scope of India's nonprofit sector). But there were other pur-
poses here as well, including bolstering the entrepreneurial role of CAF
India as an umbrella representative of some Indian nonprofits, and seeking
to ally constructively with a sympathetic government entity to forestall
stricter accountability rules.
38
37. See MATHEW CHERIAN, FINAL REPORT OF THE PILOT PROJECT ON VALIDATION OF NGOS IN
INDIA (Apr. 2001), available at http://164.100.97.14/ngo/cafreportasp.asp for information on the
CAF/Planning Commission validation initiative, and Charities Aid Foundation, Ranking/Validation of
VOs by CAF-INDIA, at http://164.100.97.14/ngo/cafmain.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) for the list of
validated organizations,
38. Another umbrella association, IndianNGOs.com, a for-profit organization supporting non-
profit activities in India, has performed credit ratings on some Bombay- and Maharastra-based nonprof-
its since February 2001. The ratings are based on "organizational systems, governance, programmes &
services, and financial aspects." CREDIBILITY ALLIANCE, supra note 36. lndianNGOs.com has devel-
oped parameters within each category and gathers data; an independent board of twelve corporate,
nonprofit, academic, and legal members determines the rating. This program has not yet had a particu-
larly wide scope but also seems in part intended to strengthen the role of the new entrepreneurial self-
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C. Restricting Access: Self-Regulation as a Market-Limiting Device
Another theme at work in India is to limit nonprofits' access to donor
and government funds through self-regulatory mechanisms. We have sev-
eral examples in India of the use of self-regulation to maintain boundaries
to entry into specific fields of nonprofit activity and to limit the number of
nonprofit providers to donors. For example, an Indian microfinance institu-
tion, Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd. ("M-CRIL"), has developed a
process for evaluating and rating microfinance institutions that includes
thirty indicators on management and staff systems, governance, and finan-
cial issues. That rating mechanism is now being applied-at least on an
initial basis-in India. Although information is sparse, it appears that an M-
CRIL Indian affiliate sends out a rating field team that reviews the records
of microfinance institutions, conducts interviews, and assigns a "relative
grading" that reflects a risk assessment as well as an assessment of capacity
needs. 39 The ratings are reviewed on an annual basis.40
This is self-regulation as a market-limiting device, particularly in a
field dominated by foreign donors and government agencies concerned
about effectiveness and increasingly convinced that that microfinance ef-
fectiveness can be measured in quantitative terms.
D. "Intranet Self-Regulation ": Finding Incentives Within Limited Net-
works, Strengthening the Power of Intermediary Funders, and Strengthen-
ing Intermediaries' and Recipients' Accountability
India and a number of other countries have strong intermediary fun-
ders-generally large NGOs or local philanthropic foundations that receive
funds from domestic or foreign governments, multilateral or private donors,
or domestic or foreign individuals, and then channel (regrant) those funds
to multiple smaller NGOs or other service providers within the country.
The original donors (both institutional and increasingly individual) demand
some accountability from the intermediary on the onward use of the funds.
In turn the intermediary NGO or foundation demands accountability from
the smaller NGOs to which it gives. That demand for accountability can
lead to domestic self-regulation mechanisms that apply within only a cer-
tain network of NGOs-those that receive funds from a particular interme-
regulation association in a crowded field of umbrella groups. Id. (Information provided by In-
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diary donor. I have called this "intranet self-regulation" to emphasize the
extension of norms and standards within closed systems of donors and
grantees.
One such Indian intermediary is the national NGO Child Relief and
You ("CRY"), which takes in donations from individual donors at home
and abroad (including substantial funds from Indians abroad, usually called
NRIs or nonresident Indians). CRY does not generally conduct its own
service programs for Indian children and families. Instead it devolves funds
and programs to a series of several hundred smaller Indian NGOs around
the country.
CRY has established a set of procedures and expectations on program,
fiscal, accounting, and other matters for CRY's grantees to follow and to
report back on to CRY. This is a form of domestic, intermediary donor-
enforced self-regulation, imposed on a defined grantee group, backed by a
key incentive (no compliance, no funding) that strengthens the authority of
the intermediary body (here, CRY) vis-A-vis both its own donors and its
grant recipients. 4 1 It is a system intended to give donors more confidence,
to build capacity and accountability within a defined number of smaller
nonprofit organizations, and to strengthen the institutional role of an impor-
tant charitable intermediary. It can also have substantial negative implica-
tions as well-giving donors considerable power over their recipients and
forcing recipients to bow to donors' notions of accountability and ac-
complishment.
42
A second example of such "intranet self-regulation" is the Give Foun-
dation's project to promote giving by India's new middle class and
wealthy, fundraising by nonprofits, and nonprofit transparency and ac-
countability so that India's new donors have some confidence in charitable
recipients. The Give Foundation is another intermediary donor-taking in
funds from individuals and corporate entities in India and beyond and re-
granting funds to NGOs around India in a sort of donor-advised fund ca-
pacity. Give's initiative includes careful selection of recipient organizations
involving mandatory criteria that emphasize accountability and transpar-
ency, and encouragement of giving to those selected organizations. Give
41. 1 am grateful to Sanjay Agarwal and Mamta Saikia for extensive discussions of this initiative.
CRY's homepage is at http://www.cry.org (last visited Mar- 7, 2005). What I call the CRY "intranet
self-regulation" initiative was substantially assisted by the Delhi-based nonprofit accounting organiza-
tion Accountaid. See AccountAid, AccountAid on NGO Accounting & Regulation, at
http://www.accountaid.net (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
42. My thanks to Harvey Dale for raising this point forcefully at the Chicago-Kent Law Review
symposium.
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also offers financial, accounting, and management assistance to the selected
nonprofits. 43
This is "intranet" self-regulation as a market-limiting device, backed
up by the availability of charitable donations to organizations that meet
Give's tests. It is intended to give donors at least some assurances of trans-
parency and accountability, and to strengthen the intermediary's ap-
proaches to its donors by imposing a form of incentivized self-regulation
on its recipients.44 Finally, as noted above, it can promote accountability
but also give substantial-perhaps too much-power to the donors as well.
E. The Return to Sectoral Norms and New Problems
In 2001 and 2002, several of these trends converged. VANI's guiding
principles had been discussed in the sector for several years. CAF's data-
base and validation project with the Planning Commission was coming to a
conclusion. The Childline India Foundation, with support from Price
Waterhouse Coopers, conducted a "Study Concerning a National Accredi-
tation Body or Performance Rating Body for NGOs and the Identification
of a Possible Framework for a Future Rating. ' '45 The nonprofit sector was
once again gearing up for Parliamentary moves to expand government
regulation of nonprofits.
From those strands came a decision to define norms that organizations
should meet and to develop a set of those minimum norms for certification
in the voluntary sector. In turn, this decision resulted in the formation of the
Credibility Alliance, a grouping of a number of key nonprofits concerned
with governance, accountability, and transparency in the Indian nonprofit
sector.4
6
The Minimum Norms for Enhancing Credibility of the Voluntary Sec-
tor defined through exhaustive discussion by the Credibility Alliance in
2001 and 2002 covered existence and registration, objectives and perform-
ance, governance, program management and human resources, accountabil-
ity, and transparency, 47 "emphasi[zing] disclosure, in keeping with the
principles of transparency and accountability rather than.., value judg-
43. Aarti Madhusudan et al., India: The Role/Influence of the Sector in the Country, in
GOVERNANCE, ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 24, at 110,
121-22, available at http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/staging/about/INDIA I.pdf.
44. Id.
45. CREDIBILITY ALLIANCE, supra note 36.
46. See Madhusudan, supra note 43, at 121.
47. The Finalised Minimum Norms for Enhancing Credibility of the Voluntary Sector are avail-
able at Credibility Alliance, Latest Draft Norms, at http://www.credibilityalliance.org/inform-
ation/Latestdraftnorms (last modified Feb. 21, 2004).
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ment. '48 Five thousand copies of the norms each in English and Hindi were
distributed to voluntary organizations around India; Tamil and Marathi
versions were printed as well, and translations were initiated in eleven
other vernacular languages. 49 Compliance with the minimum norms was
voluntary, and any accreditation, evaluation, or ratings against those norms
was assumed to be the role of separate agencies, not the Alliance itself.
50
Like other codes and best practices, these are valuable activities for
strengthening standards in the sector. But by 2003 and 2004, activity
seemed to be slowing. There was continuing discussion underway on a
range of issues, including the structure and form of an accreditation process
or some other mechanism for evaluating compliance with the Alliance's
minimum norms. The Credibility Alliance faced an uncertain future with a
number of possible roads ahead: it might "continu[e] the consensus build-
ing process," "institutionaliz[eJ the Credibility Alliance [s]tructure," or
some combination of the two.51 There was continuing discussion on the
suitable role for the Alliance: Should it continue to focus on building a
consensus for self-regulation, accountability and transparency and on the
development of the minimum norms? Should it play a role in evaluating
compliance with those norms, moving toward an evaluative or even an
enforcement role?
These questions remained under discussion at mid-2003 and into
2004.52 But the fundamental result seemed not dissimilar to that experi-
enced by VANI when it sought to promote a "code of conduct" in the early
1990s: It is notoriously difficult to develop substantial, detailed, explicit
adherence to nonprofit norms and codes, particularly where there is no
incentive mechanism to back them up. The Credibility Alliance had no
48. Credibility Alliance, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://credibilityalliance.org/inform-
ationlFAQ (last modified Feb. 21, 2004).
49. Credibility Alliance, Progress Report (October 2002-15 March 2003), at
http://credibilityalliance.org/regional-meetings/rw_ 5042003_prog-report.pdf.
50. In 2002 and 2003 the Credibility Alliance held discussion meetings in Bangalore, Mumbai,
Delhi, and other major cities to discuss the proposed minimum norms and a range of self-regulation
issues. The Alliance also discussed and developed "suggested best practices" in nonprofit accounting
procedures (expanding on earlier work done by Accountaid and others), annual reports (based on work
developed by Murray Culshaw Advisory Services), and human resource policies. See Presentation on
Accounting Procedures; Presentation on Suggested Practices on Human Resource Policies and Proce-
dures; Presentation on Suggested Practices for Annual Reports, available at
http://www.credibilityalliance.org/information/FAQ/Meetings/core-meeting (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
51. See Credibility Alliance, The Way Ahead, available at http://www.credibility-
alliance.org/coregroup/rwthe.-way.ahead.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
52. See id. By 2003 donor support for the work of the Alliance had expanded from the British
High Commission to including US AID as well as a grant from the Ford Foundation, pending grant
clearance from the Government of India. Thirty zonal workshops, four regional workshops, and a
national workshop were planned for the spring and summer of 2003.
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government funds to hold back or distribute; it played no role in determin-
ing government approvals of nonprofit formation, or nonprofit tax exemp-
tions; it had no disciplinary process-in short, it had no incentives to back
up the norms and give them force. It was an alliance rather than an aggres-
sive entrepreneurial actor, and it did not seek alliance with or any form of
capital-financial or political-from government. Its code-setting activities
may have helped to propagate ideas about good practices in the nonprofit
sector, but adherence to and enforcement of the norms seem far off.
IV. PHILIPPINES
A. The Emergence of Nonprofit Self-Regulation
Concern with self-regulation in the Philippines seems to begin with
the inauguration of the Corazon Aquino government in 1986, leading to
what may well be Asia's first major code of conduct for nonprofit organi-
zations in 1991.53 The Aquino government developed a considerably closer
relationship with the Philippine nonprofit sector than its predecessors had,
for civil society organizations played an important role in the resistance to
the Marcos regime. Nonprofit leaders also joined the Aquino administra-
tion in senior positions. Associational activity grew rapidly, and with it
concerns for accountability.
B. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Codes
The first self-regulatory responses to those accountability concerns
were traditional, and they have had mixed success. The Philippines' Cau-
cus of Development NGO Networks ("CODE-NGO") adopted the Code of
Conduct for Development NGOs in 1991, which was notable for being
"possibly among the first attempts by an NGO community to establish
provisions for self-regulation" anywhere in Asia.54 That is correct-
certainly there appears to be no earlier code of conduct developed by and
for the nonprofit community in any country of Asia surveyed. The Code
provides principles for accountability, transparency, and other key areas of
nonprofit operations. As is often the case with such codes, it helped to
53. The Philippine experience with nonprofit self-regulation is superbly surveyed and discussed in
Carmencita T. Abella and Ma. Amor L. Dimalanta's excellent country paper for the APPC Manila
conference. See Carmencita T. Abella & Ma. Amor L. Dimalanta, Philippines: NGOs as Major Actors
in Philippine Society, in GOVERNANCE, ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR, supra note 24, at 232, available at http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/stag-
ing/about/PHILIPP1NES 1 .pdf.
54. Id. at 248.
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promote new ideas about nonprofit quality and accountability but lan-
guished as a regulatory and disciplinary mechanism.,
CODE-NGO is currently working on a revision of the Code and on
sanctions and implementation policies. Notably, CODE-NGO seems to be
tying future use of the Code to stronger incentives and to a process that
includes government. It has encouraged its members to seek certification
from one of the newer and more aggressive self-regulatory associational
entrepreneurs "as one concrete and positive way of complying with the
Code of Conduct,"55 and Philippine colleagues report that much of the
planned implementation of the Code will be in conjunction with the incen-
tive-based system, discussed below-a recognition that code-based self-
regulatory systems may well need stronger incentives to be sustainable
over a long term.
C. The Second Wave: Incentive-Based Associational Entrepreneurism,
Alliance with Government, and the Emergence of the Philippine Council
for Nonprofit Certification
When proposals were made in the early 1990s to narrow tax exemp-
tions available to some nonprofits, the government suggested a nonprofit
certification mechanism for certain nonprofits. 56 That process has resulted
in the formation of an important new associational entrepreneur that
emerged solely to carry out nonprofit self-regulation-the Philippine
Council for Nonprofit Certification ("PCNC"). It has also spawned an alli-
ance with government that has both benefited the nonprofit sector and
strengthened the allying associational entrepreneur, as well as direct gov-
ernment support for a self-regulatory initiative. Underlying all of these
developments is the crucial link between nonprofit self-regulation, incen-
tives, and the government; the Philippine government has conditioned non-
profit tax exemption on compliance with heightened self-regulation
standards, forcing the sector to reach for higher standards, making a range
of nonprofits comply with the new associational entrepreneur's rules, and
in turn strengthening norms and standards in the nonprofit sector (as well
as the associational entrepreneur itself).57
55. Id. at 250. The Code is available at CODE-NGO, THE CODE-NGO REVISED COVENANT ON
PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT (July 2001), available at http://www.codengo.org/does/Revised-
Covenant.DOC.
56. PCNC notes this history in considerably more detail, at Philippine Council for NGO Certifica-
tion, PCNC: Background and Rationale, at http://www.pcnc.com.phfbackground-and-rationale.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
57. Abella & Dimalanta, supra note 53, at 251.
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Thus the nonprofit sector itself in the Philippines is now taking charge
of the certification process by which organizations achieve and maintain
their tax-exempt status, giving individual and corporate donors a tax deduc-
tion on contributions to certified organizations. This certification process
forms one core for nonprofit self-regulation in the Philippines and has be-
come an initiative discussed throughout Asia. 58 But it is not the only non-
profit self-regulation initiative in the Philippines, and several others are
mentioned below. 5
9
The certification process that resulted in the formation and operations
of the PCNC was originally developed as a three-year pilot program with
the Ministry of Finance and is now continuing. About 1,000 organizations
have applied for certification, and about 300 organizations have been certi-
fied so far, with more in the pipeline.
60
The Philippines certification process presents a different kind of self-
regulation model than many of the others around the region. It arises out of
an agreement with government for the nonprofit sector to play a significant
role in a traditional government responsibility-the granting of tax exemp-
tion-and it operates with official government support. It is a self-
regulation process rooted in taxation that operates in close cooperation with
government, a mechanism virtually unique in the region. But its importance
lies beyond that, for the process now coordinated by PCNC and several
other groups is "not only [intended] to pursue tax incentives for donors to
NGOs but also, and even more importantly, to promote professionalism,
accountability, and transparency among [NGO network] members, and the
Philippine non-profit sector."6 1
It has also been a slow process, requiring a lengthy and labor-intensive
consideration process, and it is not yet clear if it is effectively expandable
to cover a large number of nonprofits in the Philippines. Nor is that neces-
sarily its goal, and the number of organizations seeking certification may
be reduced because the incentive may not be strong enough-some organi-
zations do not perceive the need for tax exemption.
62
Despite these caveats, a new model is clearly at work in the Philippine
context. Its features include an aggressive associational entrepreneur for
58. 1 am indebted to several friends and colleagues in the Philippines for discussions of the PCNC
process, among them Rory Tolentino, Fely Soledad, Marianne Quebral, Eugene Caccam, Jaime
Faustino, and others. See the PCNC website, supra note 56, for further information on the background
and activities of the Council and Abella & Dimalanta's very useful review, supra note 53, at 251-53.
59. For further details, see Abella & Dimalanta, supra note 53, at 248-55.
60. Id. at 252.
61. Philippine Council for NGO Certification, supra note 56.
62. See Abella & Dimantala, supra note 53, at 253.
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which self-regulation is a road to a market and the core of its work in
reaching that market; an incentive-based alliance with government that
both promotes the associational entrepreneur and the importance of self-
regulation within the sector; self-regulation to limit the nonprofit market
rather than to reach all organizations; and the crucial presence of a strong
reason-tax exemption-for at least some organizations to comply with a
self-regulation process.
D. The Second Wave: Other Philippine Initiatives in Self-Regulation
Several "intranet" self-regulatory mechanisms indicate that, as noted
for the CRY experience in India, a combination of incentives (usually the
danger of losing funds from a larger donative nonprofit) and a relatively
narrow range of regulated nonprofits can result in effective self-regulation
activity.
In the late 1990s, for example, the Caucus of Development NGO
Networks developed a disclosure and sanction process (called a "whitelist")
to identify noncomplying grant recipients of the Philippines-Canada Hu-
man Resource Development Program, encourage them to comply with
reporting and financial requirements, and publicize those that did not.
Eventually sixty organizations were publicized, and several were removed
from NGO networks. As Abella and Dimalanta note, "a large segment of
the NGO community was ... able to demonstrate its ability to exact from
its member organizations greater responsibility and accountability for their
performance" 63 through a system based upon sanctions-loss of grant re-
sources-and publicity within key community networks.
A second example of "intranet" self-regulation emphasizing organiza-
tional standards and self-assessment was developed by the Children and
Youth Foundation of the Philippines for the nonprofits to which it provides
funds. This particular process relies on self-assessment by the grantee or-
ganization and validation by the Foundation, with Foundation assistance
also provided in specific areas in which weaknesses are identified. 64
63. Id at 250.
64, Id. at 255. Other self-regulatory initiatives are also underway in the Philippines. Several
nonprofit networks, including the Partnership for Philippine Service Agencies ("PHILSSA") and the
Association of Foundations, have implemented ratings systems that provide information on their mem-
bers. Philippine Business for Social Progress ("PBSP") is conducting external evaluations and peer
review of its members covering operations, program, and organizational effectiveness. Other self-
regulatory initiatives underway include a project in information disclosure called the NGO Mega Data-
bank Project, sponsored by the Philippine Association of Foundations, that seeks to provide additional
information on the Association of Foundation's members and to strengthen their cooperation with each
other and with donors. Id. at 254-55.
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V. THE NEW WAVE OF AMERICAN NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION
The first wave of American nonprofit self-regulatory efforts dates
back at least to the 1970s. These important developments have been dis-
cussed in detail by Bies, Bothwell, Brody, Chisolm, Edwards and Hulme,
Hammack, Light, and others. 65 That wave of self-regulation set in place a
structure in which some charitable industries self-regulate using extensive,
incentive-based accreditation, licensing, or other models coordinated by
powerful and well-funded regulatory organizations-we might term these
the "original" associational entrepreneurs in the self-regulation field. Other
parts of the charitable sector employ codes or best practices that help to
promote and raise standards in the sector but that are also difficult to en-
force and usually carry few incentives for compliance.
The corporate scandals of the last several years-Enron, Worldcom,
and others-and the continuing problems of nonprofit accountability have
now led to renewed attempts to make nonprofits more accountable. 66 Dis-
closure requirements are being strengthened, and Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service, and the states have proposed additional tightening of
federal and state nonprofit regulation. The nonprofit community has re-
sponded as well, through a variety of new self-regulation proposals and
initiatives intended to strengthen disclosure, enhance the credibility of the
nonprofit sector, and forestall stricter federal and state regulation. There are
perhaps three significant newer strands to recent nonprofit self-regulation
efforts, some of which resulted from earlier efforts at self-regulation:
A. Strong, Incentive-Based Accreditation and
Enforcement Organizations
A number of strong, accreditation-based, high enforcement, incentive-
based, funding-related self-regulation efforts continue to focus on tightly
65. Seesupra note 21.
66. Robert Bothwell sets out the background in depressing detail. The 1990s, he wrote, were:
a great trial for U.S. charities: the conviction of Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker for illegal ac-
tivities connected with their televangelism; the forced resignation of the founder of Covenant
House for improper advances to boys; the conviction of Bill Aramony, CEO of the United
Way of America, for misuse of funds; the conviction of the founder/CEO of the Foundation
for New Era Philanthropy for a pyramid scam; the forced resignation of the President of
Adelphi University for lavish spending; the forced resignation of the trustees of the Hawaiian
Bishop Estate for paying themselves SI million each in trustee fees and other improper finan-
cial behavior; the forced resignation of the President of Feed the Children in Oklahoma for
misuse of funds; the expose of fraudulent advertising by child sponsorship charities; the fre-
quent reports of expired, inappropriate and sometimes perverse donated corporate products-
the list goes on and on when recounting the charity scandals exposed by the media in the past
decade.
Bothwell, supra note 21.
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bordered subsets of the nonprofit and charitable community. These self-
regulatory mechanisms generally involve five key elements: mandatory
accreditation or certification efforts; a well-defined subset of the nonprofit
(or social service) community; a direct incentive-based relationship be-
tween such accreditation or certification and government or other funding
decisions (or the ability to bring in income, such as tuition); external en-
forcement mechanisms that are not solely dependent on self-enforcement
by the organizations themselves; and strong ongoing learning and resource
processes. In most cases these strong, accreditation-based, high enforce-
ment, self-regulatory efforts are mandated by funding requirements.
Examples of this strong form of self-regulation bolstered by funding
requirements are the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JHACO"), the accrediting body relied upon by the federal
government's Joint Commission and the Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services ("CMS") in determining federal transfers of funds to the hos-
pital sector,67 and the multiple accrediting bodies that serve and exercise
control within American higher education. 68 This typology is consistent
with research findings within and outside the nonprofit sector, involving
compliance with norms and self-regulation in other fields (such as the
Internet) and in theoretical models.
69
67. For further information on JHACO, see Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, at http://www.jcaho.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
68. These include, for example, the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (for
business schools); the Commission on Dental Accreditation (dental schools); the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the Association of American Law Schools (law schools); the Liaison Committee on Medical
Education, representing the American Medical Association and the Association of American Medical
Colleges (medical schools); National League for Nursing and state boards of nursing (nursing schools);
American Council on Pharmaceutical Education (pharmacy schools); Accrediting Council on Education
in Journalism & Mass Communication (journalism schools); American Library Association (library
schools); Engineering Accreditation Commission of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology (engineering schools); American Psychology Association (psychology schools); and a host
of similar institutions.
69. See, e.g., AMITAI AVIRAM, THE PARADOX OF SPONTANEOUS FORMATION OF PRIVATE LEGAL
SYSTEMS (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 192, July 2003),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-421500; AMITAI AVIRAM, NETWORK
RESPONSES TO NETWORK THREATS: THE EVOLUTION INTO PRIVATE CYBER-SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS
(Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law Working Paper No. 115, July 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=570342; Bies, supra note 21; Alnoor Ebrahim,
Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs, 31 WORLD DEV. 813 (2003); Andrew A. King &
Michael J. Lenox, Industry Selt-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible
Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J_ 698 (2000); John W. Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social
Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583 (2000).
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B. Diverse and Generally Weaker Traditional,
Code-Based Self-Regulatory Efforts
A second group of self-regulatory efforts serve important parts of the
American nonprofit sector, such as grantmaking foundations or large, na-
tional nonprofits. These are, for the most part, efforts to promote good
practices rather than enforceable mandates, and they are useful in that role,
though they rarely carry the weight of funding or regulatory incentives for
implementation, and they rarely involve alliance with government.
Examples of these efforts include the best practices codes of
Independent Sector,70 the National Council of Nonprofit Associations,
7 1
the Council on Foundations, 72  the Charities Review Council of
Minnesota, 73 the Minnesota Council on Foundations, 74 the Council of
Michigan Foundations,75 associational efforts to rate and evaluate public
charities, 76 self-regulation efforts in the fundraising industry, 77 and other
groups.
70. See INDEP. SECTOR, STATEMENT OF VALUES AND CODE OF ETHICS FOR NONPROFIT AND
PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATIONS (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.independent-
sector.org/PDFs/codeethics.pdf and the earlier (though now largely forgotten) INDEP. SECTOR,
OBEDIENCE TO THE UNENFORCEABLE: ETHICS AND THE NATION'S VOLUNTARY AND PHILANTHROPIC
COMMUNITY (2002), available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/obedience.pdf.
71. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF NONPROFIT ASS'NS, NCNA CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEMBERS (1995),
available at http://www.ncna.org/index.efm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pagelD=44 1.
72. The Council on Foundations' numerous activities in this area include: RECOMMENDED PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE GRANTMAKING (June 25, 2002), available at
http://www.cof.org/Content/General/Display.cfm?contentlD=1 56&menuContainerName=&navlD=O;
NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR U.S. COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS (Mar. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Community-Foundations/National-Standards/CFStandardsO6l004
.doe; STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR FAMILY FOUNDATIONS (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.eof.org/Content/GeneralUDisplay.cfm?contentlD=2045; STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATE GRANTMAKERS (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Corp-
orate-Grantmaking/Corporate%20Principles/Principles-Booklet_CorporateFINAL.pdf; PROPOSED
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR DISCUSSION WITH LARGE FOUNDATIONS, available at
http://www.cof.org/ContentlGenerallDisplay.cfm?contentlD=1753 (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
73. See CHARITIES REVIEW COUNCIL OF MINN., CHARITIES REVIEW COUNCIL STANDARDS (Jan.
8, 1998), available at http://www.crcnm.org/standards/standards.pdf.
74. See MINN. COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., PRINCIPLES FOR MINNESOTA GRANTMAKERS (June 11,
1996), available at http://www.mcforg/mcf/about/principle.htm.
75. See COUNCIL OF MICH. FOUNDS., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR MICHIGAN COMMUNITY
FOUNDATIONS, available at http://www.forgoodforever.orgindex.cfni/fuseactionview.i/itemD1440
(last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
76, See, for example, the rating processes in American Institute of Philanthropy, Criteria, at
http://www.charitywatchorg/criteria.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2004); BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE,
STANDARDS FOR CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY (2003), available at http://www.give.org/stand-
ards/spring03standards.PDF; Charity Navigator, Methodology: How Do We Rate Charities?, at
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfrn/bay/content.view/catid/2/cpid/35.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2005); Ministry Watch, The Ministry Watch.com S Star Ratings System, at
http://www.ministrywatch.orglmw2.I/pdf/mw5starl.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2005); Ministry Watch,
The Ministry Watch.com Transparency Grade, at http://www.ministrywatch.org/mw2.1/pdf/tg3.pdf (last
visited Mar. 7, 2005).
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Some of these-such as the fundraising codes-may include some at-
tempts at enforcement or ratings that the broader nonprofit and philan-
thropic codes rarely include. But these efforts are rarely backed by either
incentives for performance or alliance with government, making them use-
ful for strengthening standards and norms but difficult to enforce against
violators-including the violators that make the newspapers and embroil
and sully the sector.
78
Yet it is also unfair to lump all these code-based regimes together.
Some inspire more obedience than others: In general terms, the codes dis-
cussed and drafted in a participatory manner at the state level are sensitive
to local conditions (as in Minnesota or perhaps in Maryland, discussed
below) and seem to attract more attention and respect at the state level than
the broad national standards. The efforts of some of the public charity
watchdog organizations at times seem similar to the kind of associational
entrepreneurism that we noted in India and Philippines-but their effec-
tiveness and strength is limited by the lack of incentives built into the proc-
ess, and the inability to ally with government to promote enforcement.
In all cases, it is important to note that even the general codes play the
important role of identifying areas of accountability and best practice and
urging nonprofits to a higher standard of performance. That encouragement
of higher and better standards is an aspect of the new nonprofit self-
regulation should not be ignored. Nor should the political impact of even
weak codes be ignored: The discussion and promotion of codes plays a
major role in forestalling stricter government regulation of the nonprofit
sector at both federal and state levels.
In addition, there are codes or best practices for parts of the American
nonprofit sector that may not carry direct incentives for enforcement, nor
involve alliance with government, but carry very significant weight none-
theless. It may be that these occur primarily within tight-knit sectors in
which the reputational effects of violation of norms are important negative
incentives even without financial or regulatory incentives. Within the mu-
seum field, for example, the Code of Ethics of the American Association of
Museums carries substantial weight despite the lack of direct financial or
regulatory incentives for compliance or a relationship with government and
its available sanctions. 79
77. See, for example, the Association of Fundraising Professionals' standards for voluntary or-
ganizations. Association of Fundraising Professionals, The Accountable Nonprofit Organization, at
http://www.afpnet.org/tier3_cd.cfm?folderid=897&content item id=1072 (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
78. For a very useful discussion of this problem in the Minnesota context, see Bies, supra note 21.
79. See American Association of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums, at http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/ethics/coe.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
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C. The Emergence of the New Self-Regulatory
Associational Entrepreneurs
A third feature of the new self-regulatory environment is the emer-
gence of associational entrepreneurs in the United States that understand
the social need and market for nonprofit accountability. They attempt to
satisfy that market, and benefit society, through self-regulation initiatives,
training, and other contributions to nonprofit accountability. These are not
our parents' trade associations like Independent Sector and the Council on
Foundations sires to broad, useful, but hard-to-enforce codes that often
seem stepchildren of the "real" lobbying underway.
Instead, the new associational entrepreneurs are engaged in serious at-
tempts to build self-regulation as a primary goal of their organizations. At
the same time, they are hampered because those efforts generally do not
include funding or regulatory incentives for compliance, nor do they in-
volve direct alliance with government. But even these features are begin-
ning to change. Government is beginning to look toward the new
associational entrepreneurs as avenues for stronger self-regulation. Gov-
ernment also is initiating a discussion of providing funding for the spread
of serious self-regulation and funding or regulatory incentives for self-
regulatory compliance.
D. An Example of Self-Regulatory Associational Entrepreneurship: The
Maryland Standards and the Standards of Excellence Institute
One example of an American associational entrepreneur in this arena
is the Maryland Council of Nonprofit Associations. The Maryland associa-
tion developed the Standards of Excellence: An Ethics and Accountability
Code for the Nonprofit Sector, a series of self-regulatory standards for
Maryland nonprofits that emphasizes a certification regime.8 0 Thereafter
followed several years of promotion of that self-regulatory mechanism in
Maryland, along with extensive education and training efforts, resulting in
the certification of forty-four organizations (of several thousand nonprofits
operating in Maryland). 81
80. MD. ASS'N OF NONPROFIT ORGS., STANDARDS FOR EXCELLENCE: AN ETHNICS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY CODE FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2004), available at
http://www.marylandnonprofits.org/html/standards/04_02.asp.
81. Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations, Membership Directory, at
http://eseries.mdnonprofit.org/scriptcontent/index-member_search.cfm?section=Standards&memberty
pe=CERTIFIEDNONPROFIT&City-&county--Statewide&State=A&Keyword=&zip=&company=&ta
xonomy=Search+All&x=34&y= 10=#SearchResults (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
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After several years of promotion of that mechanism in Maryland, the
Maryland association obtained foundation funding from the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, Surdna Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York,
and Atlantic Philanthropies for its expansion into five other states: Louisi-
ana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, 82 and opened a
website devoted to expansion activities. 83 Versions of the Maryland Stan-
dards were rolled out in Louisiana,8 4 North Carolina,8 5 Ohio, 86 Pennsyl-
vania, 87  and Georgia88  in 2001 and 2002 for promotion and
implementation. Those states have been joined by rollouts of versions of
the Maryland Standards in Utah and other states89 and accelerating discus-
sions of nonprofit standards in Iowa and elsewhere. 90
What is now the Standards for Excellence Institute seeks national ex-
pansion of the self-regulatory Standards. Its embrace of a fairly aggressive
form of self-regulatory associational entrepreneurship is clear:
We are pleased to see outstanding progress in all five replication partner
states. Progress to date positions the replication partners to meet their ob-
jectives of full-scale implementation of the Standards for Excellence
program. However, much more work needs to be done in order to sustain
and maintain these Standards for Excellence programs at a level that will
allow for the continued success of our national replication partners' ef-
forts, as well as for preparation to work in other states. In addition, evi-
dence indicates that the Standards for Excellence program model is an
attractive one that appears to be replicable in a variety of environments.
This evidence is very encouraging and holds tremendous promise for the
82. See Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations, Replicating the Standards for Excel-
lence Program, at http://www.marylandnonprofits.org/html/standards/index.asp#replicating (last visited
Mar. 7, 2005).
83. The website is located at http://www.standardsforexcellenceinstitute.org (last visited Mar. 7,
2005).
84. Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations, Standards, at http://www.lano.org/ex-
plore.cfm/programs/standards (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
85. North Carolina Center for Nonprofits, Standards for Excellence: A Self-Help Tool for Non-
profits' Organizational Effectiveness, at http://www.ncnonprofits.org/standards.html (last updated Oct.
13, 2004).
86. OHIO ASS'N OF NONPROFIT ORGS., STANDARDS FOR EXCELLENCE: AN ETHICS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY CODE FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001), available at http://www.oano.org/Docs/-
Ohio.Standardsfinal.pdf
87. PA. ASS'N OF NONPROFIT ORGS., STANDARDS FOR EXCELLENCE: AN ETHICS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY CODE FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2002), available at http://www.pano.org/stand-
ards/standardscode.php.
88. GA. INST. OF NONPROFITS, STANDARDS FOR EXCELLENCE: AN ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
CODE FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2003), available at http://www.gcn.org/pdfs/gco-
rgia.standards.pdf.
89. Utah Nonprofits Association, Standards of Ethics for Nonprofit Organizations in Utah, at
http://www.utahnonprofits.org/stds-eths.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
90. See, e.g., Iowa Nonprofit Task Force, Iowa Best Practices, available at
http://inrc.continuetolearn.uiowa.edu/updates/Best%20PracticesB.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
20051
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
further adoption of the Standards for Excellence program across the
country.
We recognize the opportunity for the Standards for Excellence to be-
come the national standard for ethics and accountability in the nonprofit
sector, setting a high bar for governance and management practices
among state and local level organizations. We look forward to widening
the scope and audience of the program in the months and years to
come.9 1
This is entrepreneurism of a sort perhaps impossible in the broader
trade associations, such as Independent Sector. But, as the Maryland group
has recognized, entrepreneurism and replication may well be insufficient
by themselves. Yet along with their efforts, federal regulators are paying
increasing attention to nonprofit self-regulation as well.
The Senate Finance Committee's Staff Discussion Draft on nonprofit
law reforms moves the debate further along. The Senate staff suggested
that funds be provided for self-regulation efforts, endorsed the Maryland
Standards approach, suggested that the IRS contract with nongovernmental
self-regulatory organizations and-perhaps most dramatically-endorsed
the notion that the IRS directly condition "charitable status" or "authority
of a charity to accept charitable donations" on accreditation. 92 Whether
these ideas become law or not, direct incentives for self-regulation and
alliance with government appear under direct discussion. The Finance
Committee staff s language is worth quoting in its entirety:
There would be an authorization of $10 million to the IRS to support ac-
creditation of charities nationwide, in States, as well as accreditation of
charities of particular classes (e.g. private foundations, land conservation
groups, etc.). The IRS can initiate its own accreditation efforts as well as
solicit requests. Priority would be given to proposals with matching dol-
lars. The IRS would have the authority to contract with tax exempt or-
ganizations that would create and manage an accreditation program to
establish best practices ... and review organizations on an ongoing ba-
sis for compliance. Such organizations could require dues by members to
meet costs; and contract authority to review member information and
take corrective action. The IRS would have the authority to base charita-
ble status or authority of a charity to accept charitable donations on
whether an organization is accredited. The proposal should encourage
accreditation that is already taking place at the state level (e.g. Maryland,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Louisiana) or in particular classes
(nonprofit hospitals, zoos and universities) already subject to
accreditation.
93
91. See Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 82.
92. STAFF DiscussiON DRAFr, supra note 16, at 14.
93. Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted). For the records for the June 2004 hearing on charity oversight
and reform, see Charity Oversight and Reform Hearings, supra note 7.
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The Staff Discussion Draft explicitly cited the standards promulgated
by and through the efforts of the Maryland Standards for Excellence Insti-
tute, and directly cites the work of that associational entrepreneur.94 The
potential for alliance goes further, whether with the Maryland group or
with other self-regulatory associational entrepreneurs. The Staff Discussion
Draft calls for:
[f]unding of $25 million for nonprofit exempt organizations that educate
other tax exempt organizations on best practices and inform the public of
charities that are engaged in best practices; such funds would be pro-
vided to State organizations as well as national organizations to ensure
an education presence in each state; a priority would be given to organi-
zations that assist small charities in meeting proper standards and
accreditation. 95
Here we have a confluence of interest that seeks to benefit multiple
goals: forestalling stricter government regulation of the "good charities" by
strengthening self-regulation; providing direct incentives, both fiscal and
regulatory, for compliance with self-regulation; and handling these issues
in partnership with a nimble associational entrepreneur that has understood
the importance of the new self-regulatory movement, the importance of
incentives and government in its spread, and seeks government endorse-
ment and support for its organizational expansion.
In October 2004, Independent Sector-a national group representing
nonprofits throughout the United States--convened a Panel on the Non-
profit Sector at the encouragement of the Senate Finance Committee to
"recommend actions to strengthen the governance, ethical conduct, and
accountability of charitable organizations. '96 The Panel and its five work
groups (including a work group on "government oversight and self-
regulation") began intensive activities in the fall of 2004, holding field
meetings and releasing an interim report in on March 1, 2005.
97
The Panel's initial view of the benefits of self-regulation was clear, as
well as a general endorsement of government's role in "identifying and
promoting best practices and strongly encouraging compliance":
The vast majority of charitable organizations are committed to ethi-
cal conduct and responsible governance and are willing to conform to
commonly accepted standards of practice. Such practices are an impor-
tant component of the effort by the charitable sector to encourage all
nonprofit organizations to embrace the highest possible standards of
94. STAFF DiSCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 16, at 15 n.21.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Independent Sector, Senate Finance Committee Invites Sector-Wide Input to Improve Govern-
ance and Practice, at http://www.independentsector.org/panel/main.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
97. PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 16.
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conduct. Whether it be peer review and feedback, coupled with transpar-
ency in practice or more complex systems of accreditation, such initia-
tives, if actively embraced by the sector, are likely to bring about
positive change.
... [T]he charitable sector nonetheless must be actively involved in
identifying and promoting best practices and strongly encouraging com-
pliance within relevant subsectors.... Both the sector and government
should provide the resources necessary to disseminate best practices and
to develop and sustain ongoing education efforts ....- 98
The Panel deferred for its final report "specific recommendations...
for accreditation and standard-setting programs for the sector, whether the
IRS or other agencies should be designated to promulgate and administer
standards for the sector... [and] what role the sector might play in the area
of accreditation and standard-setting." 99 The Panel also agreed to "examine
the scope of. .. current systems to identify effective models, problems in
implementation, and needs for expansion of these programs, and make
recommendations regarding the Senate Finance Committee staff
proposal."100
VI. CONCLUSION:
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION
In assessing the promise and the limitations of self-regulation, we
must be cautious. To point out that most previous attempts at self-
regulation, emphasizing best practices and codes, have served very gener-
ally to raise standards rather than measurably to reduce abuses is not to call
for a full, incentive-based, government-allied regulatory regime dominated
by associational entrepreneurs.
For that sort of regime is likely to carry significant problems as well.
The long, hard process of satisfying and receiving certification from the
associational entrepreneurs is likely to be exacerbated rather than eased
when the federal govertment is funding such processes and incentivizing
compliance. The cost of such processes may bar some smaller nonprofits
from the certification table, thus preventing them from receiving some
governmental funds under a more incentivized regime. The system put in
place may unfairly benefit larger, more traditional nonprofits and discour-
age innovation and risk taking in governance, programs, and fundraising.
The involvement of government through alliance with self-regulatory
organizations may be appropriate in certain situations (such as hospitals
98. Id. § 2, at 15.
99. Id. § IV (Accreditation and Standard Setting), at 54-55.
100. Id. § IV, at 55.
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and their fiscal arrangements), but may bring government too close for
comfort to nonprofit management in a nation where nonprofit autonomy
and relative freedom from government control has always been deeply
prized. As recent events in Maryland have shown, even charities certified
under the increasingly vaunted (and funded) Maryland program are not
immune from abuses. 10 1 We must ensure that stricter self-regulation does
not narrow nonprofit autonomy and freedom, and we must be cautious that
self-regulation supported and incentivized by government does not become,
in effect, a form of government "nationalization" of nonprofit governance
and management through an ostensible "self-regulatory" process.1
0 2
So in the end we return to a splendid diversity of approaches to non-
profit self-regulation. It would be unfortunate if self-regulation moves
quickly and substantially to an accreditation or certification regime-with
government funding, incentives, and at least some control-in which non-
profits' energies are diluted from their crucially important social roles or
some charities are pushed out of the picture due to their size, a strong sense
of autonomy, or their innovative spirit.
In the end, the crisis of nonprofit accountability may need to be more
firmly called a crisis for a few "bad charities," a predicament that affects
the broader sector and leads to now-specific calls for extensive new federal
regulation. The response to the fact that most nonprofits do not violate the
law or engage in unethical activities may well be to believe that best prac-
tices or "weak codes" may in fact be all that is needed to keep most non-
profits on a straight and narrow path, along with a stronger backbone on the
part of key nonprofit and philanthropic umbrella organizations to criticize
clearly inappropriate activities of their peers, and perhaps a stricter set of
rules reserved for those organizations receiving substantial government
funding or those engaged in clearly quantifiable and rankable activities. In
seeking to forestall or ameliorate government's occasionally strong im-
pulses toward stricter regulatory plans, we must take care that the harder
forms of self-regulatory solutions do not do nearly as much damage as
well.
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